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Low-complexity power control and energy
harvesting algorithms for wiretap channels
employing finite-alphabet input schemes
Weichen Xiang, Martin Johnston, Member, IEEE, Ste´phane Le Goff,
Abstract—We discuss the design rules of an energy-efficient
wireless wiretap channel in this paper. On the transmitter side,
we investigate the optimal power control policy for secrecy rate
maximization over wiretap channels with the bit-interleaved
coded modulation (BICM) scheme. On the receiver side, an
energy harvesting (EH) algorithm is used to collect wireless
signal energy without degrading the secrecy rate performance.
These objectives are challenging as the closed-form solution to
the mutual information of finite-alphabet input schemes remains
unknown. In this paper, we derive a closed-form relationship
between the secrecy rate and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) by
transforming the SNR from the linear domain to the logarithm
domain. The optimal power control policy (PCP) can be easily
obtained by exhaustive search in a small interval, whereas the
traditional search is performed over the entire SNR range. We
also propose a sub-optimal PCP algorithm that significantly
reduces the search complexity with only a minor performance
loss. The optimal power splitting ratio (PSR) is studied to save
energy while achieving the target secrecy rate. We show that
if the transmission power is too high, the receiver is unable
to simultaneously harvest energy from the wireless signals and
achieve the target secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure and energy-saving communication receives a large
amount of attention in current research on 5G communications
technology because wireless devices are widely used and
battery capacity is usually limited. Traditional methods to
secure communication focus on cryptography techniques at
higher layers, while prolonging battery life relies on evolution
of the battery materials. However, there are two promising
techniques, namely, physical layer security (PLS) and EH,
that secures communications from an information theoretical
perspective and enable devices to recharge their battery within
the wireless signal coverage.
In a wireless network, a message sent from a transmitter
can be intercepted by many terminals within the broadcast
coverage. Hence, securing communications between legitimate
users to protect against potential eavesdroppers is challeng-
ing, especially when the eavesdropper possesses sufficient
computational resources. Physical layer security is a popular
information-theoretic approach that was first proposed in [1].
Wyner introduced the wiretap channel model [2], in which
three users are considered: the transmitter Alice sends a
confidential message to the legitimate receiver Bob, while
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eavesdropper Eve is listening on a wiretap channel. Wyner
proved that communication on the main channel (Alice to Bob)
can be perfectly secured provided that the wiretap channel
(Alice to Eve) is a degraded form of the main channel.
The maximum information transmission rate from Alice to
Bob with total ignorance from Eve is defined as the secrecy
capacity. The wiretap channel model was further studied in
[4], where the wiretap channel was a non-degraded version
of the main channel. They showed that a positive secrecy
capacity is always achievable provided the main channel is
less noisy than the wiretap channel. Around the same time,
research on secrecy capacity in [3] extended the channels
to the Gaussian channel model and proved that the secrecy
capacity is given by the difference in channel capacity between
the main channel and the wiretap channel. Considering this as
an optimization problem, [5] found that the secrecy capacity
is a convex problem with respect to the input distribution;
thus, by using a maximization technique, the secrecy capacity
is obtained. The secrecy capacity under a fading channel
environment was studied in [6] and [23], and it was shown
that a positive secrecy capacity is achieved even when the
main channel is noisier than the wiretap channel on average,
provided perfect global channel state information (CSI) is
available at the transmitter. The optimal power allocation
policy that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate was also
given in a closed-form expression [6], [7]. Moreover, in [8], the
impact of correlation between the main and wiretap channels
on secrecy capacity was considered, and it was shown that the
secrecy capacity is a logarithmic function of the average SNR
of the two channels and their correlation. The information rate
can be enhanced by using multiple antennas or by using a
cooperative communication strategy. The secrecy capacity of
multi-antenna communications was studied in [9]–[11], where
the relay assisted the wiretap channel model and showed an
advantage in secrecy capacity performance compared to all
users equipped with a single antenna.
Until now, most analyses on secrecy capacity relied on
the assumption that the codeword is infinitely long and that
the input symbols follow a Gaussian distribution. However,
in practice, the constellation size is finite due to computa-
tional power constraints and the decoding complexity. The
“channel capacity” often refers to Shannon’s capacity, which
is achievable by using Gaussian input. For finite-alphabet
input schemes, we replace the secrecy capacity with the
secrecy rate to avoid ambiguity. The secrecy rate of finite-
alphabet input schemes was studied in [12], where a power
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allocation policy for coded modulation (CM) was introduced
for a multiple-in-multiple-out (MIMO) wiretap channel model
by using an adaptive search algorithm. However, for wireless
communications, BICM is the de facto standard for improved
BER performance [15]. It was noted in [13] that the secrecy
rate can vary significantly for BICM schemes when different
mapping schemes are applied. One feature of finite-alphabet
input schemes is that the maximum secrecy rate is achieved at
a finite SNR. Therefore, research on very-high SNR regimes
is of limited importance because the secrecy rate performance
degrades when the SNR surpasses the optimal value.
Mobile devices are normally equipped with limited batter-
ies, and in many cases, replacing the battery is extremely
difficult or impossible, such as implanted devices for medical
use. Therefore, developing a reliable method to recharge the
device is vital. A promising EH approach to gather energy
from radio frequency signals was introduced in [29], which
proved that power and information can be carried by RF
signals simultaneously. Several EH protocols were presented
in [31], [32]; among the protocols, time switching and power
splitting are the most commonly researched due to the sim-
plicity of the circuit realization. Since the receiver uses part of
the signal energy for EH, the information rate performance is
degraded compared to conventional transmission. [32] noted
that the EH approach also has a negative impact on the secrecy
performance of wiretap channels. However, the secrecy rate
does not necessarily have to be maximized but only needs to
exceed a target rate. Thus, it is possible to jointly optimize the
EH and PLS algorithms over one wiretap channel.
In this paper, we study the problems of secrecy rate max-
imization, transmission power minimization and the regime
of the power splitting ratio on a BICM wiretap channel.
By exploring the relationship between the channel SNR and
the secrecy rate, low-computational-complexity solutions are
obtained for the above problems. Specifically, the main con-
tributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) A closed-form approximation of the secrecy rate
at medium SNR is obtained by applying linear-to-
logarithm domain transformation of the SNR.
2) A closed-form, suboptimal, low-complexity reducing
PCP is introduced. The secrecy rate performance is
optimal if the SNR difference between the channels is
small.
3) For a wiretap channel with a constant rate and fixed
transmission power transmitter, the range of PSR is
studied to scavenge the “wasted” energy while meeting
the target secrecy rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section II, the finite-alphabet input communication schemes
are introduced. In section III, the secrecy rate maximization
problem is addressed, and a novel transformation of the
minimum mean square error (MMSE) is introduced to solve
this problem. In section IV, the design of the EH receiver is
considered, and we investigate the relationship between the
power splitting ratio and the secrecy rate. The range of power
splitting ratios that enables the wiretap channel to satisfy the
predefined target secrecy rate is computed. Finally, in sections
V and VI, simulation results and conclusions are provided,
respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The following assumptions are made in this section: First,
the transmitter Alice has knowledge of the global channel
statement information (CSI), while both receivers have the
CSI of their respective channels. Second, we assume the SNR
difference between the main and wiretap channels is small.
These two assumptions are realistic when Bob and Eve are
users in one communication party, and Eve becomes a potential
eavesdropper as the message is confidential and only intended
to be decoded by Bob. In the remainder of this paper, the SNR
is denoted by γ for convenience.
A. Minimum mean squared error
Consider the AWGN channel where the channel input-
output function is given by
Y =
√
γX +N, (1)
where N is zero mean, unit variance Gaussian noise and X
and Y are the channel input symbol vector and channel output
signal vector, respectively. The probability density function
(pdf) of the output is
pY |X(y|x) = 1
pi
e−|y−
√
γx|2 . (2)
Let Xˆ denote the estimate of the channel input X based on the
observation of the channel output Y ; the error of the estimation
is measured using the mean square. The best estimation of X
is given by the conditional mean estimator [19], denoted as
Xˆ ,
Xˆ = E[X|√γX +N ]. (3)
The mean square error is the expectation of the difference
between X and Xˆ , which is given by
E[|X − Xˆ|2], (4)
while the MMSE is the minimum value of (4). Let M(γ)
denote the MMSE as a function of SNR; then, we have
M(γ) = minE[|X − Xˆ|2]. (5)
Let I(γ) denote the mutual information of the channel. The
relationship between I(γ) and M(γ) is given by
M(γ) =
dI(γ)
dγ
. (6)
Consider the Gaussian input case where the MMSE is given
by
MG(γ) =
1
1 + γ
log2 e. (7)
The MMSE of a finite-alphabet input needs to be evaluated by
Monte Carlo method. Using (6), the achievable secrecy rate
and the optimal PCP are obtained by employing an exhaustive
search algorithm.
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B. CM and BICM
In a CM scheme, the encoder output sequences are fed
into a pseudo-random interleaver pi, where the interleaving
is performed at the symbol level. The output sequences of
the interleaver are modulated to the symbols on constellation
χ. The received signal is designated as y, and perfect CSI is
assumed at the receiver side. The mutual information (MI) is
given by
CCM = m− Ec,h,y
{
log2
∑
s∈χ p(y|s)
p(y|x)
}
, (8)
where h denotes the channel coefficient, c denotes the m-bit
input to the constellation χ, and s denotes the constellation
symbols. It is proved in [25] that the CM scheme also satisfies
the relationship in (6).
BICM is an alternative to CM with better BER performance
over Rayleigh fading channels. The major difference between
BICM and CM is that the BICM channel capacity is affected
by the mapping technique, for example, Gray mapping and
set-partitioning (SP) mapping. Binary-reflected Gray mapping
[14] is optimal in terms of channel capacity at medium-to-
high SNR, and many alternative mappings have been proposed
to improve the BER performance with iterative decoding
[21], [22]. In the BICM scheme, the output sequences of the
encoder are bit-wise interleaved before being mapped onto
the constellation. At the receiver side, the log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) of each bit is determined and fed to the decoder. The MI
of the BICM scheme is computed via a Monte Carlo method,
as shown below
CBICM = m−
m∑
i=1
Ecˆ,h,y
{
log2
∑
s∈χ p (y|s)∑
s∈χcji p (y|s)
}
, (9)
where s ∈ χbi represents the subset of all signals s ∈ χ
whose labels are equal to b ∈ {0, 1} at position i. Since BICM
estimates the LLR of the bit sequences at the receiver rather
than the transmission symbol x, (6) is not directly applicable
to BICM schemes.
The relationship between CCM and CBICM was presented
in [27]:
CBICM =
m∑
i=1
1
2
∑
b=0,1
(CCMχ − CCMχbi ), (10)
where CCMχ and C
CM
χbi
are the CM capacities of constellations
χ and χbi , respectively.
In the next section, a transformed MMSE is introduced to
obtain the closed-form approximation of the secrecy rate. This
is followed by comparison of a low-complexity PCP algorithm
to the adaptive searching method.
III. SECRECY RATE ON RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
Initially, we consider that Alice is able to perform coding
rate and transmission power adaptive strategies provided the
perfect CSI of both channels. We introduce a method to
compute the achievable secrecy rate for cases of Gaussian
input and finite-alphabet input. Subscripts D and E represent
the source-destination channel and the source-eavesdropper
channel, respectively. We consider a classic three-terminal
wiretap model with the channel outputs given by
yD =
√
PShDx+ nD, (11)
yE =
√
PShDx+ nE , (12)
where PS is the transmission power and hD and hE are the
channel coefficients of the main channel and wiretap channel,
respectively. By definition, the achievable secrecy rate is given
by
Cs = I(γD)− I(γE). (13)
When the input message is infinitely long and Gaussian
distributed, the secrecy capacity is given by log2(
1+PS |hD|2
1+PS |hE |2 ),
and the optimal transmission power that maximizes the secrecy
capacity is found in [6] and is given by RS = log2(
|hD|2
|hE |2 )
when PS →∞. However, when the input scheme employs a
finite-sized constellation and follows an arbitrary distribution,
the secrecy rate is difficult to determine, and optimizing the
transmission power is even more challenging. Hence, we
introduce a new method to analyze the secrecy rate and power
control policy.
We write the secrecy rate RS in the integrated form rather
than the classic definition of substitution of the mutual infor-
mation:
RS =
∫ γD
γE
dI(γ)
dγ
dγ, (14)
where dI(γ)dγ is the gradient of the mutual information. The
gradient of the mutual information is equal to the minimum
mean squared error (MMSE) of the receiver estimation xˆ based
on observation y. Thus, the secrecy rate is given by
RS =
∫ γD
γE
M(γ)dγ, (15)
where M(γ) is a decreasing function for a complex Gaussian
input and the CM and BICM schemes with Gray mapping on
AWGN channels [20]. However, the interval [γE , γD] is scaled
(increasing) as PS increases. Thus, maximizing the secrecy
rate in (15) is not possible. We present a logarithm domain
transform method that greatly reduces the complexity of the
RS optimization.
First, it is important to note that the SNR difference when
measured in decibels is independent of PS and remains
constant over one fading realization.
∆γdB = γD,dB − γE,dB
= 10 log10
|hD|2
|hE |2 . (16)
Second, we denoteM(γdB) as the MMSE when the SNR is
in dB, which has the relationship M(γ) =M(γdB). Similarly,
the mutual information corresponding to the SNR in dB is
denoted as IdB(γ), which has the relationship IdB(γdB) =
I(γ). By applying the derivative chain rule, we obtain
M(γdB) = dIdB(γdB)
dγdB
=
dI(γ)
dγ
dγ
dγdB
= 0.1γ ln(10)M(γ). (17)
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Therefore, the secrecy rate is given by
RS =
∫ γD,dB
γE,dB
M(γdB)dγdB . (18)
Define M¯(γdB) as the mean value of M(γdB) within
[γE,dB , γD,dB ]; the secrecy rate is then simplified to
RS = ¯M(γdB)(γD,dB − γE,dB). (19)
It is shown in 19 that the secrecy rate is the linear equation
of the difference of SNR in dB. The curves of M(γ) and
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M(γdB) for Gaussian input, CM and BICM on AWGN
channels are compared in Fig.1 and Fig. 2, respectively.
A. Power control policy
The PCP enables the transmitter to adapt its transmission
power according to the CSI to achieve higher secrecy rate
performance than fixed power transmission. Assume a wiretap
channel in which Alice is allowed the maximum transmission
power PT . According to (14), increasing PS leads to expansion
of [γE , γD], but M(γ) approaches zero as MI achieves log2M .
By applying (19), the optimal transmission power that maxi-
mizes the secrecy rate is equivalent to maximizing M¯(γdB)
within the SNR range of interest.
The M(γdB) curves are shown in Fig. 2. The global
maximum M(γdB) values for each CM and BICM curve
are achieved at finite SNRs, while the maximum M(γdB)
value for the Gaussian input is achieved when γdB →∞. We
define γopt as the SNR whenM(γdB) reaches the maximum.
Since γopt is unique for to each modulation format and signal
labelling combination, it is reasonable for the communica-
tion system to generate a look-up table of γopt of common
communication schemes for quick searching. Gray mapping
has lower values of γopt and M(γopt) than SP mapping
for a given same constellation. As the maximum value of
M(γdB) is achieved at finite SNR, the optimal PCP shifts
[γE,dB , γD,dB ] by varying the input power PS until (18) is
maximized. However, exhaustive search is the only possible
method to determine the optimal value of PS . Therefore, we
present a low-complexity sub-optimal PCP in Algorithm I.
ALGORITHM I: FAST PCP
1 Find γopt from the look-up table,
2 If limPS→PT
γD,dB+γE,dB
2 ≥ γopt, the optimal
transmission powerPˆS is to let
γD,dB+γE,dB
2 = γopt
3 If limPS→PT
γD,dB+γE,dB
2 ≤ γopt, full power transmission.
Algorithm I shows that PˆS is given by
PˆS =

10
γopt
10
|hD||hE | , for PT ≥
10
γopt
10
|hD||hE |
PT , for PT ≤ 10
γopt
10
|hD||hE | , (20)
where PˆS is the transmission power computed from the
proposed PCP, and PT is the total available transmission
power.
B. High transit power budget analysis
In cases where sufficient power is available at the transmit-
ter, an optimal PCP is always applicable. Thus, the achievable
secrecy rate is optimized in the high SNR regime. The rela-
tionship between γdB and RS can be approximated in closed
form. The following conclusions can be drawn from the small
SNR gap assumption.
Theorem 1: The achievable secrecy rate at high SNR, de-
noted as RhighS , is a linear function of the SNRdB difference
between the main channel and the wiretap channel on AWGN
channels.
RhighS ≤MdB(γopt)(γD,dB − γE,dB). (21)
proof 1: Since MdB(γopt) ≥MdB(γ), we have
RS =
∫ γD,dB
γE,dB
M(γdB)dγdB
≤
∫ γD,dB
γE,dB
M(γopt)dγdB
= M(γopt)(γD,dB − γE,dB)
, RhighS . (22)
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TABLE I
MdB(γopt) AND γopt VALUES OF WIDELY USED SCHEMES
Input scheme M(γopt) γopt
16QAM-CM 0.244 8 dB
16QAM-Gray 0.252 7 dB
16QAM-SP 0.382 10.7 dB
64QAM-CM 0.288 14.7 dB
64QAM-Gray 0.308 13 dB
64QAM-SP 0.398 16 dB
One special case is when γopt → ∞, which implies the
Gaussian input is adapted, and the secrecy capacity CGS is
given by
CGS = lim
PS→∞
∫ γD,dB
γE,dB
0.1 log2(10)
γ
1 + γ
dγ
= 0.33(γD,dB − γE,dB), (23)
where M(γ →∞) = 0.33, which completes the proof.
The values of MdB(γopt) and γopt of various modulation
and mapping schemes are listed in Table I.
C. Secrecy rate approximation in the medium SNR range
A closed-form solution for the secrecy rate performance
of a BICM scheme is desirable in information theory. Fig.
2 shows that for finite-alphabet input wiretap channels, the
secrecy rate achieves the same value for two PS values, which
demonstrates that additional power can be consumed with no
secrecy rate performance enhancement for a finite-alphabet
input wiretap channel. This feature indicates that to achieve a
target secrecy rate, the transmission power must be selected
from a limited range. However, the search for proper PS
relies on an adaptive search method; it is interesting to obtain
a closed-form approximation of M(γopt) that fits the exact
curve with considerable accuracy and low complexity in the
SNR of interest. Fig. 2 demonstrates that the M curves of
various mappings around γopt closely match general quadratic
functions. We define a function Mˆ(γdB) = β1γ2dB +β2γ+β3
to approximate the M curves in the medium SNR range.
The coefficients β1, β2, andβ3 are obtained by substituting
(γdB ,M(γ)) of the curves into the general quadratic function.
β1, β2, andβ3 are rounded to 4 decimal places to balance
the accuracy of the approximation and the complexity of the
computation. We list some coefficients of the quadratic curve
that approximatesM(γ) for 16QAM and 8PSK constellations
around γopt.
For 4QAM, Gray mapping, β1 = −0.0024, β2 = 0.0097,
and β3 = 0.1497, the quadratic function is
Mˆ4QAM (γdB) = −0.0024γ2dB + 0.0097γdB + 0.1497. (24)
For 8PSK, Gray mapping, β1 = −0.0019, β2 = 0.0168, and
β3 = 0.158, the quadratic function is
Mˆ8PSK(γdB) = −0.0019γ2dB + 0.0168γdB + 0.1580. (25)
For 16QAM, Gray mapping, β1 = −0.0019, β2 = 0.027,
and β3 = 0.155, we obtain the approximation function
Mˆ16QAM (γdB) = −0.0019γ2dB + 0.027γdB + 0.155. (26)
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According to (14), the approximation of the secrecy rate,
denoted as RˆS is given by
RˆS ≈ β1
3
(γ3D,dB − γ3E,dB) +
β2
2
(γ2D,dB − γ2E,dB)
+β3(γD,dB − γE,dB). (27)
The approximation matches the secrecy rate in the low-to-
medium SNR range, which is of most interest to PCP because
the secrecy rate performance degrades at higher SNR.
D. Transmission power minimization
Consider that Alice sends a confidential message at a
constant information rate rather than performing adaptive rate
transmission according to the CSI. The target secrecy rate,
denoted as RT , has to satisfy RS > RT for perfect secrecy.
To determine the minimum PS for RT , we simplify (27)
into a function of PS
RT ≤ RˆS
= (γD,dB − γE,dB)(β1
3
(γ2D,dB + γ
2
E,dB + γD,dBγE,dB)
+
β2
2
(γD,dB + γE,dB) + β3)
=
3β1
4
∆γdBT
2 + β2∆γdBT +
β1
4
∆γ3dB + β3∆γdB , (28)
where T = γD,dB + γE,dB , which can be expressed by
T = 10 log10 |hD|2 + 10 log10 |hE |2 + 20 log10 PS . (29)
It is shown that T is an incremental function of PS , and the
minimum PS is obtained when T is minimized. The minimum
T is obtained by solving
3β1
4
∆γdBT
2 + β2∆γdBT +
β1
4
∆γ3dB + β3∆γdB −RT = 0.
(30)
Because β1 < 0, the minimum T is given by
T =
−b±√b2 − 4ac
2a
, (31)
where a = 3β14 ∆γdB , b = β2∆γdB and c =
β1
4 ∆γ
3
dB +
β3∆γdB − RT . Note that there exist two values of T for
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(30): the larger value represents the maximum value of PS
for the wiretap channel to achieve RT . Thus, the minimum
transmission power is given by
PS =
10
T
20√|hD|2|hE |2 . (32)
IV. DESIGN OF THE ENERGY HARVESTING RECEIVER
The curves compared in Fig. 3 showed that the approxima-
tion of the secrecy rate matches the simulation results very
well at medium SNRs, while at high SNRs, the approxima-
tion is less accurate. For 4QAM, the approximation is very
accurate from low SNRs up to γopt, but as the constellation
size increases, the accuracy of the approximation decreases.
However, the secrecy rate approximation still matches the
simulation of the 16QAM Gray mapping scheme very well
from 1 dB to 9 dB. Since the RT is achieved at two values
of SNR, one is smaller than γopt, while the other is larger
than γopt. From the perspective of energy saving, the smaller
SNR, whose secrecy rate performance RS ≥ RT , is optimal.
Consider the wiretap channel with target secrecy rate RT
where the transmitter is unable to perform rate and power
adaptive transmission. In this case, partial transmission energy
is wasted if the channel condition is good and RS is greater
than RT . However, the “wasted energy” can be scavenged and
stored in the battery by applying EH. Among the various EH
techniques, we focus on power splitting. Assume a wiretap
channel model with a target secrecy rate RT and with all nodes
equipped with EH receivers. The power splitting coefficients
of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper receiver are
denoted as ρD and ρE , respectively. If ρD = 0, the intended
receiver harvests no energy from the RF signal and uses all
the power for information decoding, while ρD = 1 indicates
that the intended receiver collects all the energy for battery
charging.
In a typical EH receiver, there are two types of noise,
one introduced by the analogue-to-digital conversion (ADC)
process, which we denote by na, and the other due to channel
noise, which is denoted as nc. Both na and nc are Gaussian
noise with zero mean and variances σ2a and σ
2
c . Normally, the
channel noise nc is ignorable because it is negligible relative
to na. Thus, we only consider the ADC noise and assume
the channel noise nc = 0. For convenience, we assume that
σ2a = 1 at both receiver devices. After power splitting, the
received signals for information decoding yI are given by
yID =
√
(1− ρD)PShDx+ na,D, (33)
yIE =
√
(1− ρE)PShEx+ na,E . (34)
The receiver can harvest energy from both the RF signal and
the channel noise, while the ADC noise remains constant. In
terms of the achievable secrecy rate, the worst case is that
the eavesdropper uses all the power to decode the confidential
message and harvests no energy from the RF signal, i.e., ρE =
0. We use γˆD,dB and γˆE,dB to define the SNRs at the signal
decoding input of the main channel receiver and the wiretap
channel receiver, respectively. Thus, γˆD,dB and γˆE,dB satisfy
the following relations
γˆD,dB = 10 log10 |hD|2PS + 10 log10(1− ρD)
= γD,dB + µ, (35)
γˆE,dB = γE,dB , (36)
where µ = 10 log10(1− ρD) denotes the power splitting ratio
in decibels. To achieve the target secrecy rate RT , the EH ratio
of the destination receiver has to be chosen properly to satisfy
the following conditions
RT < RS (37)
subject to
ρD > 0, PS > 0. (38)
If ρD is too small, excessive energy is wasted, and the battery
of the receiver is charged slowly. If ρD is too large, then
the secrecy rate of the wiretap channel is smaller than the
predefined target secrecy rate, and as a result, the confidential
message cannot be transmitted to the destination with perfect
secrecy. The condition in (37) can be reformulated to
RT ≤ RˆS
=
β1
3
(γˆ3D,dB − γ3E,dB) +
β2
2
(γˆ2D,dB − γ2E,dB)
+β3(γˆD,dB − γE,dB). (39)
The maximum γˆD,dB is obtained when RT = RS . Define
J(γˆD,dB) as a function of γˆD,dB ,
J(γˆD,dB) =
β1
3
γˆ3D,dB +
β2
2
γˆ2D,dB + β3γˆD,dB + ω, (40)
where
ω = −(β1
3
γ3E,dB +
β2
2
γ2E,dB + β3γE,dB)−RT . (41)
Let J(γˆD,dB) = 0. The three roots of J(γˆD,dB) can be
solved by Cardano’s method [33], and the roots are denoted
as R1,R2, and R3. We assume the three roots satisfy
R1 ≤ R2 ≤ R3. (42)
Only R2 is in the range (γE,dB , γD,dB) as R1 and R3 are
generated by the negative values of RˆS . The maximum ρD
and minimum PS are given by
ρmaxD = 1−
100.1R2
PS |hD|2 . (43)
PminS =
100.1R2
|hD|2 . (44)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to validate
the analysis of the previous sections.
First, we evaluate the secrecy rate of BICM schemes with
the proposed fast PCP on AWGN channels. 16QAM and
64QAM are selected as the modulation schemes with Gray
and set-partitioning mapping. The total transmission power
PT = 1. At high SNRs, the transmitter is able to allocate
sufficient power to implement the fast PCP algorithm, the
simulation of the secrecy rate performance at high SNR is very
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate on AWGN channels. The SNR gap is 2 dB. The dashed
lines are the high SNR approximations of the secrecy rate.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate on AWGN channels. The SNR gap is 5 dB. The dashed
lines are the high SNR approximations of the secrecy rate.
close to the high SNR approximation results. We illustrate the
high SNR secrecy performance at SNR gaps of 2 dB and 5
dB and show that the approximation is more accurate when
the SNR gap is smaller.
It is shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 that the upper bound
on the secrecy rate RhighS derived in (22) is an accurate
estimation of CS when the SNR difference between the main
and eavesdropper channels is small at high SNR. However,
the accuracy decreases as the SNR gap increases, such as a
gap of 5 dB. Additionally, RhighS is less accurate when SP
mapping is employed than when Gray mapping is employed
for the same constellation at high SNR. This is because
the curve for M(γdB) with SP mapping is not as flat as
that of Gray mapping near γopt; therefore, the accuracy of
RhighS decreases as the difference between M¯ and M(γopt)
increases. Furthermore, SP mapping achieves a higher secrecy
rate than Gray mapping at high SNR but costs additional
transmission power.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the performance of RS with and
without the proposed fast PCP. The dotted curves indicate
that the transmitter always performs full power transmission
PS = PT = 1, while the dashed curves inidcate that the
secrecy rate is obtained by using optimal PCP (exhaustive
search algorithm). Without PCP, RS increases as the SNR
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate performance over Rayleigh fading channels. γ¯D = γ¯E .
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rate performance over Rayleigh fading channels with sub-
optimal PCP. γ¯D = γ¯E .
increases before reaching γopt. However, after reaching the
peak value, RS decreases as the SNR increases and ultimately
approaches zero. By contrast, with the proposed fast PCP, RS
performs the same as fixed power transmission at low SNRs,
but RS does not decrease at high SNRs and remains at the
maximum value.
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Fig. 8. The minimum PS for target RT . ∆γ = 4 dB.
In Fig. 8, the SNR gap is 4 dB. The simulation shows
that, on one hand, the required PS for target secrecy rate RT
decreases exponentially as the SNR in both channels increases.
On the other hand, the curves demonstrate that to achieve a
1556-6013 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2749161, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
8
0 5 10 150
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Total transmission power in dB
En
er
gy
 h
ar
ve
st
in
g 
ra
tio
 
 
Target secrecy rate is 0.2 bit/channel use
Target secrecy rate is 0.3 bit/channel use
Target secrecy rate is 0.4 bit/channel use
Target secrecy rate is 0.5 bit/channel use
Fig. 9. The maximum EH ratio at the destination receiver: the main channel
gain is 6 dB and the wiretap channel gain is 4 dB.
higher target rate, a larger PS is required.
Fig. 9 demonstrates the maximum EH ratio at the des-
tination receiver, provided the target secrecy rate RT . As
the target secrecy rate increases, the amount of harvested
energy decreases. At high PS , ρD decreases to 0 because the
information rate in the wiretap channel is increased and the
secrecy rate RS < RT . Thus, no energy can be harvested from
the RF signal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The secrecy rate of the finite-alphabet input of the SISO
wiretap channel model is investigated in this paper. Similar to
Gaussian input, the minimum transmission power for the target
secrecy rate is a decremental function of the wiretap channel
coefficient. In contrast to Gaussian input, the maximum se-
crecy rate is achieved in the medium SNR range, depending
on the modulation and signal labeling. The EH ratio of the
BICM wiretap channel decreases to 0 when the input power
increases to infinity. In future works, we will study the secrecy
rate on the MIMO BICM wiretap channel where, because the
SNR gap no longer remains constant, designing an optimal
power allocation algorithm is a major challenge.
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